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COMMENTS
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT:
NEW INCENTIVE FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
INTRODUCTION
When the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)' was adopted, Congress was optimistic about the role
that the legislation would play in eliminating a serious problem
faced by many older Americans. The purpose of the Act is
exemplary. The intention of Congress was "to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment."2 Unfortunately, the
expectations of Congress have not been realized. In spite of the
federal law, discrimination in employment based on age is still
prevalent, and there are indications that it is increasing.,
A recent decision, however, presents hope for an increase
in the number of private suits to enforce the ADEA. In Novem-
ber of 1975, a federal district court in New Jersey ruled that an
employee unlawfully forced into retirement could recover dam-
ages for pain and suffering under the ADEA.1 Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Engineering Co.5 is the first reported case to make
such an award under the Act.' In doing so, the court has pro-
vided redress for one of the most harmful results of age discrim-
ination, a result clearly recognized by Congress when the legis-
lation was proposed and adopted.7 The Rogers court's authori-
zation of the award of damages reflects an awareness that the
physiological and psychological damage to the victim of age
discrimination is often greater than his out-of-pocket loss.
This comment discusses the appropriateness of compensa-
tion for pain and suffering under the ADEA, and the impact
such awards could have on the enforcement of the Act. After
1. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970).
2. Id. § 621(b).
3. Note, Discrimination against the Elderly: A Prospectus of the Problem, 7
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 917, 922 (1973); see note 32 infra.
4. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 331.
7. See notes 85-91 and accompanying text infra.
406 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
an overview of the ADEA as background, the comment assesses
the enforcement of the Act to date, considers the obstacles to
private suits, and discusses why an incentive is needed for
private litigation. The Rogers decision, recognizing compensa-
tory damages as an appropriate award, is then examined. Since
ADEA litigation is only now entering the recovery stage,8 sup-
port for the result in Rogers is drawn from the legislative his-
tory and the language of the Act, a comparison with damages
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 and an exami-
nation of the judicial treatment of damages in other discrimi-
nation contexts. The prospect of adequate compensation for
injury under the Act should provide litigants with the much-
needed incentive to pursue their legal rights, and could give
new force to the ADEA.10
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act" makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee
or applicant who is between forty and sixty-five years of age"2
on the basis of that individual's age. Specifically, an employer
may not discharge or refuse to hire any such individual because
of his age, nor may the employer discriminate against him with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of his
employment.' 3 The prohibitions of the Act also extend to em-
8. The term "recovery stage" refers to that phase of litigation in which the court
must interpret and implement the remedial provisions of the Act. Earlier cases under
the ADEA were concerned largely with procedure and the scope of the Act's prohibi-
tions. The recovery stage is reached only after the complainant has met the procedural
requirements and has established a violation of the Act's provisions. See Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (5th Cir. 1974); Levien, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent
Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227, 246 (1974).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
10. The most widely recognized problem with the ADEA is the scope of its
protection, which ends at age sixty-five. This aspect of the Act is not dealt with in this
comment. For a treatment of the problem of the Act's age limitations, see, e.g., Com-
ment, Mandatory Retirement-A Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 116 (1974); Comment, Discrimination Against the Elderly: A Prospectus of the
Problem, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 917 (1973).
11.. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970).
12. Id. § 631.
13. Id. § 623(a). That section provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for an empldyer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
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ployment agencies" and to labor organizations.' 5
The Act provides for several fairly broad exceptions to its
provisions. It is not unlawful for an employer, employment
agency or labor organization to take any action otherwise pro-
hibited, "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business, or where the differentiation is based upon reasonable
factors other than age . . . . "' An employer may also retire or
refuse to hire an individual pursuant to the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or employee benefit plan, provided that such
plan or system is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
Act. 7 Finally, an employer may always discharge or discipline
any individual for good cause.'8
Education of the general public was one of the means by
which Congress intended to give effect to the purposes of the
Act.'" The Secretary of Labor was directed to provide "an edu-
cation and information program to assist employers and em-
ployees in meeting employment problems which are real and
dispelling those which are illusory .... "20 Such a program is
helpful in the long run, but education alone can not succeed in
achieving immediate compliance with the Act's purposes;
therefore, methods of enforcement are also provided.2
Enforcement of the Act is left primarily to the Secretary
of Labor. The Secretary has the power to make investigations,
to require the keeping of necessary records, and to compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers
and documents. 21 It was intended by Congress "that the re-
sponsibility for enforcement, vested in the Secretary by §7 [29
U.S.C. §626], be initially and exhaustively directed through
informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion
and formal methods be applied only in the ultimate sense.",,
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's age; ....
14. Id. § 623(b).
15. Id. § 623(c).
16. Id. § 623(f)(1).
17. Id. § 623(f)(2).
18. Id. § 623(f)(3).
19. Id. § 622.
20. 11967] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2214; see 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1970).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1970).
22. Id. § 626(a).
23. 113 CONG. RIc. 34,748 (1967); see S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1967).
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Formal methods of compliance were intended only if voluntary
compliance could not be achieved."4 Therefore, before any liti-
gation, the informal methods provided for in the ADEA must
be exhausted.25
The ADEA provides for civil action by private individuals
as well as by the Secretary of Labor." In order for a private
individual to bring suit under the Act, that individual must
give the Secretary of Labor not less than sixty days notice of
his intent to file an action. 27 Such sixty-day notice must be filed
within time limitations set forth in the Act.28 During this sixty-
day period the Secretary of Labor is directed to "seek to elimi-
nate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of con-
ciliation, conference and persuasion. '2 Only after the sixty-
day period has expired, and only if the Secretary of Labor
declines to sue, may an aggrieved individual bring suit for legal
or equitable relief.30 If a violation of the ADEA can be proved,
the aggrieved individual is entitled to "such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
chapter ... 3
ENFORCEMENT TO DATE
In spite of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
discrimination against older workers is still prevalent.2 En-
forcement of any anti-discrimination statute is difficult, since
this is an area where subtleties of conduct can make detection
and proof of violations difficult. Despite the difficulty in prov-
24. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970) provides, in part: "Before instituting any action
under this section, the Secretary shall attempt to eliminate the discriminating practice
or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the requirements of this
chapter through informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion."
26. Id. § 626(c).
27. Id. § 626(d).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 626(c) provides:
Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent
jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such
action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Sec-
retary to enforce the right of such employee under this Chapter.
31. Id. § 626(b).
32. The secretary of Labor reported to Congress that the Wage and Hour Division
received 4717 complaints of bias in violation of the ADEA, an increase of 55% over the
figure for fiscal 1974. This rise followed increases in previous years. 91 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 201, 218 (1976).
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ing and providing remedies for violations, it can be argued that
the Act, as enforced by the Secretary of Labor, has not met its
potential for alleviating age discrimination.
Evaluations of the effectiveness of the Act have uniformly
recognized enforcement as a problem area. Although the Act
became effective on June 12, 1968, by 1970 there had been only
ten court cases filed under the Act.3  As late as December, 1971,
one court was able to state that it could find only two reported
cases under the ADEA. 34 In its evaluation of the ADEA in 1971,
the White House Conference on Aging questioned whether the
Act was being vigorously enforced. 35 The Senate's Special Com-
mittee on Aging expressed similar reservations about enforce-
ment. In a report presented in 1972, the committee stated:
More than 2500 violations were found under the Act
in fiscal year 1971 .... And these figures probably repre-
sent only a small portion of the infractions under the law,
since many illegal practices go unreported.
Yet only 80 suits have been filed under the Act, de-
spite the prevalence of job bias because of age.36
The committee recommended an increase in funding for the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, to provide additional
personnel to enforce the Act more vigorously.37
A more recent study attempted to pinpoint and explain
the problem in enforcing the Act.38 The analysis indicates that
the problem stems from a lack of emphasis on enforcement of
the ADEA within the responsible division. The investigation
and enforcement provisions of the ADEA follow those of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and are administered in the Wage
and Hour Division, Employment Standards Administration of
the Department of Labor.39 The study found that enforcement
33. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, IMPROVING THE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW, A
WORKING PAPER, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SEN. SPECIAL
COMM., WORKING PAPER].
34. Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 233 n.1 (N.D. Ga.
1971).
35. Comment, Mandatory Retirement-A Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 116, 135 (1974).
36. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1971 AND JANUARY-
MARCH 1972, S. REP. No. 784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1972).
37. Id. at 53. Increased funding was provided in 1974, when Congress authorized
appropriations of up to five million dollars. 29 U.S.C.A. § 634 (1975). At the same time,
Congress expanded the coverage of the Act by expanding the definition of "employer."
Id. § 630(b).
38. SEN. SPECIAL COMM., WORKING PAPER, supra note 33, at 2.
39. Id. at 13. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
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of the ADEA is only a small part of the activities of the Wage
and Hour Division, which also enforces minimum wage, over-
time and equal pay laws. In both staff and expenditures, the
enforcement of the ADEA was found to represent less than five
percent of the total for the entire Division. Considering the
nationwide scope of the Act and the complexities of the law,
the amount of money and man-years devoted to the enforce-
ment of the ADEA was found to be "amazingly small."4
Within the Wage and Hour Division, ADEA enforcement activ-
ities are vastly overshadowed by the enforcement of the more
traditional minimum wage and overtime laws.4
Subsequent information provided by the Secretary of
Labor indicates little change in the pattern of inadequate en-
forcement.2 The statistics provided in the Secretary's annual
reports are difficult to interpret, but it is apparent that full use
is not being made of the available remedies or resources. One
thing is clear from the reports. There is a noticeable discrep-
ancy between the number of violations the Department states
it has found, and the number of enforcement suits brought. 3
The reports fail to explain this discrepancy. Recognizing the
40. SEN. SPECIAL COMM., WORKING PAPER, supra note 33, at 17. The report stated
that the budget request for 1974 was less than half of the authorized three million
dollars. Another report to the Senate showed that in 1969, 46 positions within the
Division were allotted to the new program; by 1974, the number of positions had
increased only to 69. SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1973
AND JANUARY-MARCH 1974, S. REP. No. 846, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (197.4).
41. SEN. SPECIAL COMM., WORKING PAPER, supra note 33, at 17.
42. The information referred to is that provided by the Secretary of Labor in the
annual reports to Congress required by section 632 of the ADEA. The reports are
contained in the Labor Relations Yearbooks.
43. For example, in 1973, the Department found monetary violations in 217
establishments; income was restored to employees in 96 firms, but during that year
only 46 suits were filed. [1974] LAB. REL. Y.B. 381. In 1974, the Department reported
finding monetary violations in 277 firms, and achieving compliance with 110 firms, but
only 47 suits were filed during that year. [1975] LAB. REL. Y.B. 413. In both years,
non-monetary violations were also found.
The Secretary of Labor categorizes violations of the Act as either "monetary" or
"non-monetary." Id. The latter category includes illegal advertising, refusals to hire,
discharges, and promotion denials. Id. The damages the Secretary reports having
recovered are in the monetary violation category, and it appears that damages are not
even considered in the non-monetary types of violations. Not only can violations such
as refusals to hire, discharges and promotion denials result in out-of-pocket loss, but
discrimination in these stages of employment also can result in the type of pain and
suffering documented in Rogers. Rogers itself involved illegal termination. Compensa-
tory damages are not mentioned at all in the Secretary of Labor's reports. It appears
that the emphasis is on the more traditional wage and hour problems of recovery of
back or unpaid wages. The legal remedies provided by the ADEA have apparently not
been sought by the Department of Labor.
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scope of age discrimination, it seems incongruous that by the
end of 1974, some six years after the Act became effective, only
224 suits to compel compliance had been instituted by the
Secretary of Labor."
Based on these figures, it would seem that the effective-
ness of the ADEA will be dependent in large part on the initia-
tive of aggrieved individuals in bringing suit. Until recently,
however, there had been little incentive for a private individual
to pursue his complaint to its ultimate resolution in the
courts. 5 Congress intended that the Secretary of Labor bear
the primary responsibility for enforcement.46 This intention is
reflected in the Act's requirement of the sixty-days' notice an
individual must give the Secretary before instituting suit.'7 In
addition, if there is an applicable state age discrimination stat-
ute, no action may be brought under the ADEA until sixty days
after state proceedings are commenced,48 unless such proceed-
ings have been terminated earlier. 9
Once the statutory prerequisites are met,5" the individual
may proceed with his action, but the courts have not awarded
relief commensurate with all of the injuries suffered as a result
of the discriminatory act. Until recently, courts which have
reached the issue of damages have construed the Act's provi-
sions5' fairly narrowly. In Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement
44. [1975] LAB. REL. Y.B. 413.
45. For a discussion of some of the technical problems in bringing suit under the
ADEA, see Comment, Mandatory Retirement-A Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51
CHI.-KENT L. IEv. 116, 133-34 (1974).
46. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
48. State proceedings are deemed to commence when the complaint is filed with
the state agency. See 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1970).
49. Id.
50. The Department of Labor has cited as a "major enforcement problem" the
failure of complainants to follow proper procedures in filing private age discrimination
suits. More than two-thirds of all reported suits filed in fiscal 1975 were dismissed by
the district courts on procedural grounds. 91 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 201, 218-19 (1976).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1970) provides the remedy for a violation of the Act. That
section states, in part:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except
for subdivision (a) thereof), and 217 of this title [these sections are part
of the Fair Labor Standards Act], and subdivision (c) of this section
Section 216(b) provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of ... this title shall be liable
to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages . . . and an additional amount as liquidated damages
1977]
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Corp.,5" the court discussed the question of damages. It found
that in a case of wrongful discharge, the damage award should
be equal to the amount of back pay owing to the plaintiff, from
the date of discharge until the trial date, reduced by whatever
benefits or other income the plaintiff had received in the in-
terim."3
One commentator has stated that "the principal relief con-
templated by the Act is job restitution, rather than money
damages, and private litigation is discouraged."54 Indeed, this
is an accurate description of the relief awarded under the Act
prior to Rogers. Traditionally, courts have not recognized that
the greatest injury to a victim of age discrimination may not
be the loss of wages. The humiliation and psychological suffer-
ing and the sometimes resulting physical symptoms, have gone
uncompensated in age discrimination cases. As a result, there
has been little incentive for private suit, since the most that
could be expected at the end of the long process was back-pay
and reinstatement. At that point, reinstatement may be im-
practical or unacceptable, and the back-pay award may, in
some cases, be insignificant, since it is reduced by whatever
benefits or salary the individual received in the interim.55
Since enforcement by the Secretary of Labor doesn't ap-
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). Section 626(b) continues:
Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall
be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages ... for the purposes of sections
216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall be
payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any action
brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including, without limitation, judgments com-
pelling employment, reinstatement, or promotion, or enforcing the liabil-
ity for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages ...under this
section ....
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). Subsection (c) provides for a private right of action. See
note 30 supra for the text of subsection (c).
52. 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
53. Id. at 234-35 (dicta). It should be noted that the concept of back-pay has
been found to include seniority benefits, pension benefits, bonuses, travel expenses,
moving costs, and interest. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1259-60, 1260
n.350 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
54. Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique,
19 N.Y.L.F. 309, 319 (1973).
55. Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
For an example of greatly reduced back pay awards in a private suit, see Bishop v.
Jeleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 597 (D.D.C. 1974). In that case, the minimal backpay
awards were offset somewhat by a restoration of benefits to several plaintiffs whose
benefits would have vested had they not been illegally discharged.
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pear to be as vigorous as it could be, some incentive must be
given to private individuals to encourage them to pursue their
legal rights. A New Jersey district court has recently taken a
step that may provide this much-needed incentive. In Rogers
v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.,5 the court construed the
language of the Act broadly, so as to authorize an award for
pain and suffering.57 This holding, under which an aggrieved
individual can expect to be fully compensated for all the harm
caused by illegal discrimination, could provide the necessary
encouragement for individuals to litigate their claims.
THE ROGERS DECISION
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. was a private
enforcement action brought by a former employee of Exxon to
recover for alleged age discrimination,"s Exxon having forced
Rogers to take early retirement at the age of sixty. The court
termed Dr. Rogers "a leader in his field";"5 he held two masters
degrees and a Ph.D., and was a scientist and inventor of recog-
nized merit. 0 He was the first employee to attain the position
of Senior Research Associate in the Product Research Division
at Exxon, and from time to time he traveled to various univers-
ities to recruit new personnel. 1 He had been employed by de-
fendant Exxon, except for a one year lapse, since 1938.2 Rogers'
personal physician testified to a number of work-related physi-
cal conditions caused by nervous disturbance, which the court
and jury found to be predictable consequences of the termina-
tion proceedings. In addition, Rogers experienced feelings of
uncertainty and distrust of the dependability of his own reac-
tions, to the point that he was afraid to drive. His physician
described his symptoms as "a classical picture of an anxiety
reaction or a nervous disturbance."" The court found that, as
a proximate result of the defendant's illegal discrimination,
Rogers experienced a syndrome of severe abdominal pain, vom-
56. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
57. Id. at 333. In a subsequent case, Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976), the district court relied on the broad interpretation
in Rogers to find that punitive damages are recoverable under the ADEA.
58. After the death of Dr. Rogers in 1973, his wife and daughter continued the
action as co-executrixes of his estate. 404 F. Supp. at 326.
59. Id. at 329.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 330.
63. Id. at 330 n.2.
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iting and impotency. 4
After a jury verdict finding Exxon liable, the parties stipu-
lated to out-of-pocket damages of $30,000,15 but, in addition,
the court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to demonstrate
damages for pain and suffering inflicted by the unlawful ac-
tions of the defendant." The jury returned a verdict setting
the amount of compensation for pain and suffering at
$750,000.67 The court found this amount excessive, and reduced
it to $200,000.6
In authorizing this award, the court stated that "[iut is
the Court's view that the ADEA essentially establishes a new
statutory tort. Once liability is established, therefore, the pan-
oply of usual tort remedies is available to recompense injured
parties for all provable damages."6
Although the court found no reported case authorizing
such an award under the ADEA, it noted that "[t]he suitabil-
ity of compensatory awards for pain and suffering has been
recognized in other discrimination contexts . . . ."" In particu-
lar, the Rogers court stated that the ADEA "may profitably be
compared with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in both
purpose and scope."'" Damages for "psychic injuries" have
been awarded under Title VII by a court that held "that the
purpose of the Act will best be served if all the injuries which
are caused by discrimination are entitled to recognition. 7 2 In
a recent analysis of Title VII remedies, the Supreme Court held
that Congress intended for that statute "to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful discrimination."73
The "make whole" purpose of Title VII is shared by the
ADEA,74 and merely forcing compliance with either statute
does not make the victim whole.
In measuring the wrong done and ascertaining the appro-
64. Id. at 330.
65. Id. at 326.
66. Id. at 327.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 338.
69. Id. at 327.
70. Id. at 331. The various statutes and cases relied on by the court are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 100-42 infra.
71. Id. at 328. With regard to the "profitably compared" language, see note 101
infra.
72. Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832, 835,
(W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
74. 404 F. Supp. at 328.
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priate remedy, the Rogers court recognized that "the most per-
nicious effect of age discrimination is not to the pocketbook,
but to the victim's self-respect."' , In comparison to the psy-
chological and physiological damage done by unlawful discrim-
ination, "the out-of-pocket loss occasioned by such discrimina-
tion is often negligible . .7.6."I Because of various mitigating
factors, such as pension benefits or other salary, the real loss
may not be the out-of-pocket loss; the real loss may lie else-
where.77 The court found that unlawful conduct by an employer
toward an older worker, such as the unlawful termination in
this case, "has predictable consequences in terms of the vic-
tim's physical and emotional well-being."" s The symptoms
experienced by Rogers, which were clearly demonstrated to
have been proximately caused by the defendant's illegal con-
duct, would be wholly uncompensated by an out-of-pocket
award .79
The court was careful to point out that the award of dam-
ages for pain and suffering was not punitive in purpose." It "is
designed solely to effect full and adequate compensation for all
injuries sustained as a result of the unlawful and tortious con-
duct." The court's examination of the legislative history con-
firmed its view "that the Congressional purpose mandates an
award of compensatory damages for pain and suffering, upon
an appropriate factual showing.""2
The Rogers court summarized its ruling as follows:
[L]t is the opinion of this Court that the ADEA creates a
statutory tort, and empowers the Court to employ a wide
range of legal and equitable remedies in the exercise of the
broad remedial discretion normally associated with actions
arising from intentional torts. The Congressional history
and cases decided under this and analogous civil rights
statutes clearly contemplate redress of the emotional and
75. Id. at 329.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 330.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court did not further explain what is intended by "an appropriate
factual showing." Depending upon the meaning given to "appropriate" by other
courts, the award of compensatory damages could be either expanded or restricted. For
a potential meaning of "appropriate," see text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
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psychological injury proved in this case by the relief
awarded by the jury."
Accordingly, a court has available the full range of tort reme-
dies in addition to the specific statutory remedies in redressing
violations of the ADEA.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER THE ADEA
Support for the result reached in Rogers can be drawn from
various sources. Of primary importance is the legislative his-
tory and the language of the Act itself. Additionally, support
for a full award of compensatory damages can be drawn from
Title V111 4 and the cases interpreting that Act, even though the
statutory sections authorizing remedies in the two acts differ.
Finally, the courts' treatment of remedies under the early Civil
Rights Acts can be used to bolster the position taken here.
The ADEA-Its Language and Legislative History
There is ample authorization for an award of compensa-
tory damages in the legislative history of the ADEA and in the
language of the Act itself. There are numerous indications in
the records of debates of the Act that Congress was concerned
with more than the purely economic effects of age discrimina-
tion. It was argued in the House that "although the economic
loss is a serious one, the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in
happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these
citizens and their families."85 After pointing out that age bar-
riers in employment are costly in a financial and social sense,
one representative stated:
The financial and social costs, of course, are nothing
compared with the costs in terms of human suffering and
welfare which comes about as the result of discriminatory
practices in employment because of age .... Self-esteem,
83. Id. at 333. Since the ADEA creates a new statutory tort, traditional tort
remedies, including pain and suffering damages, are available in appropriate circum-
stances. Accord, Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1405
(N.D. Ga. 1976). This is in line with the prevailing view of the courts as to the recovery
of damages for emotional distress generally, at least when intentionally caused, and
with the view of the Restatement, Torts 2d. See Chase, Recovery of Damages for
Emotional Distress Resulting from Racial, Ethnic, or Religious Abuse or
Discrimination, 40 A.L.R. 3d 1290, 1293-94 (1971).
84. Title Vn1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
85. 113 CONG. REC. 34,744 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Kelly, quoting President John-
son's Older American message to the Congress of January 23, 1967).
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self-satisfaction, and personal security are important by-
products of employment in industrial America."
There are numerous other references in the Congressional
Record to the psychological side-effects of age discrimination,
and it is apparent that Congress saw such effects as one of the
consequences of age discrimination."s In addition, concern for
the physical and psychological effect of unemployment on
older Americans was supported by medical evidence. 8
One representative explained that the Act recognized two
distinct types of unfair discrimination based on age:
[f]irst, the discrimination which is the result of misunder-
standing the relationship of age to usefulness; and second,
the discrimination which is the result of a deliberate disre-
gard of a worker's value solely because of age. The results
of the two types of discrimination are the same, but the
remedies called for are different.
The second type of unfair discrimination is more per-
nicious."9
Representative Dwyer discussed this latter type of discrimina-
tion, the type that "consists of the blunt, blind refusal, rigid
and unbending, to employ workers once they have passed an
arbitrary age, however able or qualified they may be.""0 She
noted that such discriminatory policy "only adds to long-term
86. 113 CONG. REC. 34,745 (remarks of Rep. Eilberg).
87. See, e.g., the House debate, where Representative Dent stated that "[Tihe
problem addressed by H.R. 13054 is so obvious that to belabor it is to dull it. I am
talking about the frustration and failure many workers incur in trying to gain employ-
ment when they happen to be 40, 50 or even 60 years of age." 113 CONG. REc. 34,746
(1967) (emphasis added). Representative Hawkins recognized that employment pro-
vided "opportunities for fulfillment, independence, [and] . . . a dignified subsist-
ence." Id. at 34,744 (emphasis added). It was noted by Representative Halpern that
"[flor many years our increasingly youthful society has allowed thousands of skilled
and competent people to slip into a backwash of hopelessness and despair." Id. at
34,749 (emphasis added).
88. A report of the American Medical Association was referred to during the
House debate which stated that "these statistics can never express the mental and
physical anguish experienced
by mature workers after they have lost their jobs. However, newly an-
nounced findings by Dr. Sidney Cobb of the University of Michigan re-
vealed that more than one-half of the men who were laid off at a Detroit
plant developed significant psychological and physiological changes. A
job loss, according to Dr. Cobb, frequently brings a rise in the incidence
of ulcers, arthritis, and high blood pressure.
S. REP. No. 784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1972).
89. 113 CONG. REc. 34,747 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Dent).
90. Id. at 34,752.
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unemployment, high relief costs, and extensive human suffer-
ing and despair. "',
Voluntary compliance can probably be achieved in situa-
tions involving discrimination resulting from misunderstan-
ding, through the administrative process of conference and
conciliation. It is in the second type of situation, where a delib-
erate discriminatory policy is followed and formal methods are
necessary to achieve compliance, that an award of damages for
the pain and suffering caused would appear particularly appro-
priate. It is difficult to imagine that Congress would so explic-
itly recognize the existence of a problem and then leave that
problem unredressed, when the remedy was well within the
scope of the proposed legislation. The language of the ADEA
reflects the broad remedial purpose of Congress, and shows
that Congress did not fail to provide an appropriate remedy."
Like Title VII, discussed in more detail in the following
subsection, the ADEA provides for equitable remedies. These
restitutionary forms of relief, i.e., job restitution and back pay,
are commonly awarded under both acts. But unlike Title VII,
the ADEA provides for legal remedies as well. Section 626(b)
of the Act states that "[iun any action brought to enforce this
chapter, the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See note 51 supra for the text of the enforcement provisions. Although the
ADEA incorporates the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970), courts are not limited to the type of relief available under the
FLSA in redressing ADEA violations. Until the Rogers decision, courts had granted
awards only of back pay, since back pay is the remedy available under the incorporated
provisions of the FLSA. See, e.g., Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d
818 (5th Cir. 1972); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (dictum).
Legislative history indicates that the emphasis was placed on the enforcement
procedures provided by the FLSA, not on the specific remedies that that Act allowed.
According to a Senate report on the bill, "The investigation and enforcement provi-
sions of the bill essentially follow those of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The enforce-
ment provisions replace those in the original bill which were similar to the National
Labor Relations Act approach." S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
Senator Javits explained the difference between the original Senate bill and the
version eventually adopted. The original version, by calling for NLRA agency-type of
enforcement, with administrative hearings prior to judicial review, "would have re-
quired the establishment within the Department of Labor of a wholly unnecessary new
bureaucracy, complete with hearing examiners and regional directors, investigators
and attorneys." Id. at 13. The bill was revised in committee, and "the enforcement
techniques of the FLSA have been incorporated by reference in this bill .... Id. The
emphasis seems to have been on the procedure of enforcement, not on the specific
remedies the FLSA provided. See 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967) (Senate debate); id.
at 34,748 (House debate).
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poses of this chapter . . . .""-Section 626(c), which provides for
individual action, states similarly that "[a]ny person ag-
grieved may bring a civil action . . . for such legal or equitable
relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter . . .,,"
Compensatory damages have traditionally been viewed as
a legal remedy. In general, compensatory damages are awarded
to replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury." Mental pain
and suffering resulting from a wrong which in itself constitutes
a cause of action is considered a proper element of compensa-
tory damages.'" The wrongdoer is held "liable to the person
injured in compensatory damages for all of the natural and
direct or proximate consequences of his wrongful act or omis-
sion." 7
If only back pay awards were intended, there would have
been no need to have provided for legal remedies, since back
pay is considered restitutionary, and therefore an equitable
remedy." Section 626(b) enumerates certain types of relief
which are available and although compensatory damages for
pain and suffering are not specifically included, Congress ex-
pressly provided that its enumeration of remedies was not ex-
clusive, by prefacing its enumeration with the language
"including without limitation."99 Congress clearly contem-
plated redress of the physical and mental suffering caused by
age discrimination, and provided for legal as well as equitable
remedies to accomplish the remedial purpose of the Act.
Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' 00 provides the
most profitable analogy with the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, since the ADEA was patterned closely after
Title VII.'0 ' Traditionally, the only monetary relief the courts
93. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
94. Id. § 626(c).
95. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 17 (1966).
96. Id. § 63; accord, 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 197 (1965).
97. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 18 (1966).
98. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). See note 51 supra for the pertinent part of this
subsection.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
101. The Rogers court states that the ADEA may be profitably compared with
Title VII. 404 F. Supp. at 328. See Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d
818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court stated: "With a few minor exceptions the
provisions of this enactment are in terms identical to those of Title VII of the Civil
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have awarded under Title VII has been back pay.0 Most courts
and commentators who have considered the question have
taken the view that Title VII, as originally enacted, did not
provide for the recovery of compensatory damages, 3 since
compensatory damages have traditionally been classified as
legal relief, and Title VII provided for equitable relief. How-
ever, Title VII was amended in 1972, and the provision for relief
was considerably broadened. Section 2000e-5(g) now provides
that
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay .... or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate .... 104
Rights Act of 1964 except that 'age' has been substituted for 'race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.'" Accord, Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311 (6th
Cir. 1975).
There is one problem with the analogy, however, that should be recognized. Com-
mentators appear to favor an interpretation of Title VII that would allow for compensa-
tory and even punitive damages. See note 105 infra. The courts, on the other hand,
while recognizing the arguments in favor of such awards, have almost uniformly re-
jected them, feeling bound by the statutory language limiting relief to equitable relief.
See Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-42, 1341-42 nn.6&7 (D. Hawaii 1974). The
language of the ADEA is not so limiting. The analogy between the two acts may be
most helpful if confined to their shared purposes and scope. The difference between
the provisions of the two acts was pointed out in Murphy v. American Motors Sales
Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976), where the court found the provisions
of the ADEA not so limiting as Title VII.
102. Developments, supra note 53, at 1259.
103. Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimi-
nation Cases, 27 ARK. L. REV. 603, 611 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Richards]. The
view that only back pay would be awarded was based primarily on the wording of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). As originally enacted, that section stated, in part, "the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay." This provision was modeled
after section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). It
was thought that since the NLRB traditionally restricted its monetary awards to those
which could be classified as back pay, remedies under Title VII should be similarly
limited. Developments, supra note 53, at 1259 n.349.
Although the wording of the NLRA is similar to that of section 2000e-5(g), NLRB
rulings are not necessarily controlling in interpreting Title VII. Since the NLRB is an
administrative agency, it can operate only within the confines of its statutory grant of
power. A court acting under Title VII, however, could rely on its inherent judicial
power to fashion an adequate remedy. See Comment, Tort Remedies for Employment
Discrimination under Title VII, 54 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 n.40 (1968).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1974). The phrases added by the 1972 amendment
are italicized.
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Several commentators have recognized the need for and
appropriateness of compensatory relief under Title VII.'"I In an
article written before the 1972 amendment, one author stressed
the importance of individual relief to effective enforcement of
Title VII,'"' and suggested that "[sipecific statutory authority
is not an essential prerequisite to the existence of power in
federal courts to grant relief in damages to enforce the object
and purpose of a particular statute."'0 7 In another pre-
amendment article, the author stated that the ineffectiveness
of the private action derives primarily from the inadequacy of
remedies available to an aggrieved individual.'"' He noted the
remedial scheme "completely ignores some types of injuries
which result from discrimination by an employer,"'' 9 specifi-
cally psychological injuries, and suggested the granting of tort
remedies "as a supplement to the limited relief provided by the
statute ...."110
A more recent article considered the effect of the 1972
amendment on Title VII's remedial scheme."' The author
argues that the amended section 2000e-5(g) should be inter-
preted to allow the recovery of compensatory damages. He re-
lies on the legislative history of the amendment, which indi-
cates that the dominant purpose of Congress was to put plain-
tiffs in the position where they would have been were it not for
the unlawful discrimination."' This language is "the classic
statement of the principle underlying compensatory dam-
ages.""93
105. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 103; Developments, supra note 53 (this arti-
cle favors an award of punitive damages rather than compensatory damages);
Comment, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-A Prayer for Damages, 5 CAL. W.L.
REV. 252 (1969); Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination under Title VII,
54 VA. L. REV. 491 (1968).
106. Comment, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-A Prayer for Damages, 5
CAL.W.L. REV. 252 (1969).
107. Id. at 260.
108. Comment, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII,
54 VA. L. REV. 491, 492 (1968).
109. Id. at 493.
110. Id. at 497.
111. Richards, supra note 103.
112. Id. at 613 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972)).
113. Id. at 613. See also 25 C.J.S. Damages § 63 (1966). Id. at n.40 states: "Where
an allowance is made for mental pain and suffering, it is an element of actual or
compensatory, as distinguished from exemplary or punitive damages .... [The] basic
objective of damages for injuries to feelings is to make the injured party whole ...."
Although the statute uses the term "equitable relief" and "affirmative action," the
author believes that, in view of the clearly expressed purpose of the Act, it is probable
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With one exception, courts have found that compensatory
damages for mental suffering are not available under Title
VII.'" In that case, Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Ce-
ment Co.,"' damages for mental distress were awarded. After
evidence of mental distress was received, the court noted that
the psychic harm which might accompany an act of discrimi-
nation might be greater than would first appear."' The court
then summarized the characteristics of discrimination which
required the availability of such damages to provide complete
relief to injured parties:
[t]he loss of a job because of discrimination means more
than the loss of just a wage .... Discrimination is a vicious
act. It may destroy hope and any trace of self-respect.
that Congress used the terms in a popular rather than a legal sense. Richards, supra
note 103, at 613.
The meaning of the amended section was explained to Congress as follows:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide
discretion in exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most com-
plete relief possible. In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts
have stressed that the scope of the relief under that section of the Act is
intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that
the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the
particular unlawful employment practice complained of but also requires
that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful
employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972). The Senate report on the amendment expressed similar
intent: "The provision is intended to give the Commission wide discretion in fashioning
the most complete relief possible to eliminate all of the consequences of the unlawful
employment practice caused by, or attributable to, the respondent." S. REP. No. 415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1972).
Since the ADEA and Title VII share the purpose of making the victim whole, it
can be argued that the wide discretion Congress intended the courts to use in providing
a remedy under Title VII should also be available under the ADEA. Although the
purpose of the two acts is the same, the remedies provided are different in nature. See
text accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
114. On the other hand, there has been some recognition of the psychological
damage that may result from discrimination. In Rogers v. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Comm., 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), the court
stated: "We must be acutely conscious of the fact that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the
purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of
ethnic discrimination." Id. at 238. It was the court's belief that "employees' psycholog-
ical as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection." Id. at 238. This
court did not reach the issue of damages.
115. 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691
(5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 490 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1974). This case was decided under
Title VII as originally enacted.
116. 369 F. Supp. at 834.
19771 A GE DISCRIMINATION
That, and not the loss of pay is perhaps the injury which
is felt the most, and the one which is the greatest."7
The court concluded that the purpose of the Act would best be
served if all of the injuries which result from discrimination
were entitled to recognition."' The court in Humphrey recog-
nized that Title VII suits are primarily suits in equity, but held
that in an appropriate case, legal remedies may also be
awarded."'
Most decisions which have rejected claims for compensa-
tory damages under Title VII have done so primarily on statu-
tory grounds which are inapplicable to the ADEA. The statu-
tory language referred to is contained in section 2000e-5(g):
"The court may ... order ... any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate.' ' 10 The ADEA, on the other hand,
expressly provides for legal as well as equitable relief. Section
626(b) provides, in part, "the court shall have jurisdiction to
grant such legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate
... ,,1 The Title VII decisions which have denied compen-
satory damages have done so on the grounds that "[t]he sta-
tutory language makes clear that only equitable relief may be
granted under §2000e-5(g), and punitive and compensatory
damages have traditionally been classified as legal relief."'
117. Id.
118. Id. at 835.
119. The Humphrey court stated that although Title VII suits were primarily
suits in equity, in an appropriate case legal remedies could be awarded without de-
tracting from the equitable basis of the suit. Id. at 842. In support of this proposition
the court cited 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 237d (5th ed. 1941) in which the
author notes:
It may be stated, therefore, as a general proposition, that a court of equity
declines the jurisdiction to grant mere compensatory damages, when they
are not given in addition to or as an incident of some other special equi-
table relief, unless under special circumstances the exercise of such juris-
diction may be requisite to promote the ends of justice.
In this case, the court found it could only "promote the ends of justice" by granting
the requested relief (compensatory damages for psychic injuries). 369 F. Supp. at 843.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
122. Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D. Hawaii 1974); accord, Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 836 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Although the court in Loo disallowed a claim for compensatory damages, it stated
that the statute could be interpreted so as to make such damages available. 374 F.
Supp. at 1341 n.6.
Some courts have taken a fairly narrow view of the purpose of Title VII, and have
denied recovery of damages on the ground that the statute is primarily intended to
correct a serious public problem, and the compensation of private grievances is only a
secondary concern. Development, supra note 53, at 1261.
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Courts have recognized the need for compensatory dam-
ages under Title VII, but have felt restrained by the language
of that Act and have not made such awards.'2 The ADEA
imposes no such restrictions on the discretion of the courts in
fashioning appropriate remedies." 4 It seems likely, therefore,
that courts which have not granted compensatory relief under
Title VII based on the language limiting the remedy to equi-
table relief would make such an award under the ADEA. The
wide discretion Congress intended the courts to use in provid-
ing the most complete relief possible to victims of discrimina-
tion"'2 has been further broadened by the ADEA's provision for
legal as well as equitable relief.2 '
The Civil Rights Acts
The appropriateness of compensatory damages awards for
pain and suffering has been recognized by the courts in other
discrimination contexts, where the statutory protection has
been found to create a new legal duty and therefore a new tort.
It is well established that compensatory damages are available
under sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act statutes,,"
despite the fact that neither of those sections expressly pro-
vides for such a remedy. 2 In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Another judicial view is that private suits were intended to play only a limited
role within the scope of Title VII, such suits being merely a means to an end in
accomplishing the purpose of the Act. Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 10 FEP CASEs 730,
739 (D. Utah 1975). Other courts have not adopted so narrow a view. See, e.g., Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). In Bowe the court stated: "The
clear purpose of Title VII is to bring to an end the proscribed discriminatory practice
and to make whole, in a pecuniary fashion, those who have suffered by it." Id. at 720
(emphasis added).
The former view may be unnecessarily narrow. One commentator has noted that,
although as originally conceived, Title VII would primarily have established a 'public
right,' and only incidentally created a private one, the orientation of the Act changed
from public rights to private remedies during the numerous compromises which pre-
ceded its passage. Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 430, 432, 467 (1965).
123. See note 101 supra.
124. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra. See also Murphy v. Ameri-
can Motor Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976), where the court stated
that "Title VII is distinguishable from the Age Act in this regard inasmuch as relief
under Title VII is limited to equitable remedies, whereas the Age Act provides for both
equitable and legal relief."
125. See note 113 supra.
126. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) (1970).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970).
128. Id. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
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Inc.,'29 an action was brought under sections 1981 and 1982 for
injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Supreme Court
considered the question of what damages, if any, might appro-
priately be recovered for a violation of those sections. The
Court likened the problem to the situation presented in Bell v.
Hood, 30 where suit was brought for alleged violations of the
fourth and fifth amendments. In both cases, federal statutes
provided protection for certain rights, but did not, by their
terms at least, provide any remedy. In Bell, the Court ruled
that
[w]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be
alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done. 3'
The Sullivan court relied on Bell in holding that "[t]he exist-
ence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary
and appropriate remedies.' '3
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind and to no other.
Id. § 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
129. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
130. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
131. Id. at 684.
132. 396 U.S. at 239. The Court went on to say that compensatory damages for
deprivation of a federal right are governed by federal standards. Id. at 239. The
"federal standards" referred to are provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). That section
provides:
The jurisdiction in civil . . .matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons
in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but
in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses
against the law, the common law, as modified and changed by the consti-
tution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil . . . cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
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Following Sullivan, courts have awarded damages for
mental suffering, humiliation and embarrassment under the
Civil Rights Act statutes.3 3 Such an award has been made
under section 1983'13 as well, on the theory that the civil rights
statutes "should be read against the background of tort liabil-
ity that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions.' ' 35
The same result could be reached under the ADEA. The
pain and suffering demonstrated in Rogers is, in many cases, a
"natural consequence" of discriminatory action. The ADEA
creates a right to be protected against age discrimination much
the same as the Civil Rights Act protects against racial dis-
crimination, and, in the language of Sullivan, "the existence of
a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and
appropriate remedies.' 36 If this language can support an award
of compensatory damages where no remedy was specifically
provided by statute, it could likewise support the same award
The Sullivan court interpreted this section to mean that both federal and state rules
on damages may be utilized, whichever best serves the policies expressed in the federal
statutes. 396 U.S. at 240.
133. See, e.g., McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying 42
U.S.C. § 1981); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying 42
U.S.C. §§ 1982, 3212); accord Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 821 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021, 1027 (1974); Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio
1975); McNeil v. P-N & S, Co., 372 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (applying 42 U.S.C.
99 1982, 3604(a),(d)); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Ore. 1973)
(applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gonzalez v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc. 363 F. Supp.
1200 (E.D. Va. 1973) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Cf., Lazard v. Boeing Co., 322 F.
Supp. 343, 345-346 (E.D. La. 1971) (discussion of remedies available under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
135. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); accord, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 556 (1967); Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147, 150, n.11 (3d Cir. 1971). See, e.g.,
Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) (compensatory damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983). Cf. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141,
1143 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding tort liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82).
136. 396 U.S. at 239. It might be argued that the reasoning of Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946), quoted in Sullivan is applicable only where, as in 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-83, the statute does not explicitly provide for a remedy, and that it is inapplicable
where a remedy is provided, as in the ADEA. It should be noted, however, that the
same language of Bell v. Hood was recently quoted by the Supreme Court in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). Albemarle was an action brought under
Title VII, which, like the ADEA, contains provisions for a remedy.
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under the ADEA, where legal remedies are expressly allowed.'37
Compensatory damages are also awardel under the Fair
Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.'1 s The
Supreme Court has held that an action under Title VIII
"sounds basically in tort-the statute merely defines a new
legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff
for the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach."'3 9 In
Steele v. Title Realty Co.,"10 the court stated that damages in
housing discrimination cases are not limited to out-of-pocket
losses, but may include an award for emotional distress and
humiliation.' 4 ' Although temperate conduct may be considered
as a mitigating circumstance in determining damages, the
right to recover for the humiliation and emotional distress suf-
fered was held to exist even though "the discrimination was
perpetrated in a courteous manner, and was not vindictive or
abusive."''
Thus, compensatory damages for pain and suffering or
mental distress have been held to be available not only where
the statute expressly provides for actual damages, but also
where it fails to do so. Like Title VIII, the ADEA defines a "new
legal duty," and like Title VIII, the ADEA authorizes compen-
satory damages by providing for legal relief. It should not be
necessary to imply the right to compensatory damages under
the ADEA. The Civil Rights Act cases which have done so only
lend greater support to the recognition that pain and suffering
are a "natural consequence" of discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Litigation under the ADEA is only now entering the recov-
ery stage. Few courts have yet reached the issue of damages
under the Act; the interpretation the courts choose to give the
enforcement provisions of the Act will be determinative of its
success in combating age discrimination. Central to the issue
of damages is the recognition that much of the effectiveness of
137. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1970).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1970).
139. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974). It should be noted that 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(c) expressly authorizes an award of actual damages. That section provides, in
part: "The court may . . . award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than
$1000 punitive damages ....
140. 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
141. Id. at 384; accord, Jeanty v. McKey& Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th
Cir. 1974); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
142. 478 F.2d at 384.
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the ADEA will be dependent upon the initiative of the com-
plainant. Since vigorous enforcement by the Secretary of Labor
is lacking, complainants must be encouraged to pursue correc-
tion of prohibited practices through individual private suit.
Offering compensation for all of the injuries sustained would
provide this encouragement.4 3
The legislative history and the language of the ADEA pro-
vide solid support for compensatory damage awards. Although
courts are hindered in providing complete redress of injuries
under Title VII by the language of the statute, there is no such
obstacle in the ADEA. The language of the Act in fact compels
such a result since Congress expressly provided for legal as well
as equitable relief under the Act. Given the broad language of
the statute, "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congres-
sional purpose."'"
The decision in Rogers indicates that at least one court has
recognized the importance of adequate compensation of indi-
viduals in ensuring the effectiveness of the ADEA. There is a
need for vindication of individual rights at the same time a
public wrong is remedied. The competency of the district
courts in confronting the complexities of anti-discrimination
statutes and in resolving the troublesome issues that arise in
their practical implementation has been recognized in the con-
text of Title VII.'" A full explication of the scope of the statute
can be achieved only through the process of litigation. There
is no reason that the courts should not exhibit the same exper-
tise and independence in enforcing the ADEA. The most effec-
tive incentive that can be offered is found in strong and effec-
tive remedies to redress individual grievances. "' The Rogers
court has provided such incentive by allowing recovery for all
of the harm caused by discrimination. Not only is an award of
compensatory damages appropriate in the context of the Act,
it is consistent with relief in other discrimination cases.
Peggy Springgay
143. See Comment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act-A Prayer for Damages, 5
CAL. W.L. REV. 252, 259 (1969) for a similar argument in relation to Title VII.
144. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1969).
145. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also, S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 86-87 (1972) (views of Mr. Dominick).
146. See Comment, A Survey of Remedies Under Title VII, 5 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTs L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1973) (considering Title VII remedies).
